UNIVERSITY FACULTY SENATE

SUMMARY OF AGENDA

September 16, 1991

I. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

II. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES: April 22, May 6 and May 13, 1991

III. REMARKS BY PRESIDENT ROSELLE and/or PROVOST PIPES

IV. ANNOUNCEMENTS: Senate President Taggart

V. OLD BUSINESS

A. Report and recommendation from the Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment in South Africa

VI. NEW BUSINESS

A. Election of the chairperson of the Committee on Committees and Nominations

B. Recommendation from the Committee on Committees and Nominations to delay its report on the use of outside legal advisers in actions before the Committee on Faculty Welfare and Privileges

C. Resolution amending the Faculty Handbook relative to the Committee on Instructional, Computing and Research Support Services

D. Introduction of new business
September 5, 1991

TO: All Faculty Members
FROM: Harrison B. Hall, Vice President
       University Faculty Senate
SUBJECT: Regular Faculty Senate Meeting, September 16, 1991

In accordance with Section IV, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, the regular meeting of the University Faculty Senate will be held on Monday, September 16, 1991 at 4:00 in room 110 Memorial Hall.

AGENDA

I. Adoption of the Agenda.

II. Approval of the minutes of the Senate meetings of April 22, May 6 and May 13, 1991.

III. Remarks by President Roselle and/or Provost Pipes.

IV. Announcements: Senate President Taggart

V. Old Business

   A. Report and recommendation from the Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment (D.Colton, Chairperson). (This report was originally presented at the April 22, 1991 Senate meeting and tabled until the September meeting. The report is at Attachment 1.)

Based on our considered deliberations and our extensive consultations and, after having fully considered the significant political changes that have taken place in South Africa, we hereby recommend to the University Faculty Senate the adoption of the following resolution:

WHEREAS, the University of Delaware continues to deplore the policy of apartheid still practiced in South Africa, and
WHEREAS, the University of Delaware has the moral and intellectual responsibility to provide leadership in opposition to this abhorrent policy, and

WHEREAS, divestment has proven to be an effective weapon against apartheid in South Africa, and

WHEREAS, a fundamental and irreversible rupture with apartheid policy has not yet occurred, and taking note of the continuing calls for sanctions by organizations representative of the majority of South Africa's people, and

WHEREAS, considering that the suspension of armed struggle in South Africa makes economic pressure against apartheid all the more significant at this historic juncture, be it

RESOLVED, that the University Faculty Senate of the University of Delaware recommend that the officers and trustees of the University divest the University of stocks, bonds and other holdings in all corporations that have operations in South Africa.

VI. New Business

A. Election of a chairperson of the Committee on Committees and Nominations from among the committee members elected by the Senate.

Frank B. Dilley (Philosophy)

David W. Smith (Life & Health Sciences)

B. Recommendation from the Committee on Committees and Nominations (J. Olson, Chairperson) to delay its report on the use of outside legal advisers in actions before the Committee on Faculty Welfare and Privileges.

WHEREAS, in the March 11, 1991 Faculty Senate meeting, the University Faculty Senate referred the following resolution to the Committee on Committees and Nomination for consideration:

Except in cases involving termination (or non-renewal) of faculty, in hearings before the Committee on Faculty Welfare and Privileges, the choice of "advisers" or "observers" who may participate in the hearing shall be limited to persons selected from the University of Delaware faculty. In a termination (or non-renewal) complaint before the Committee the decision whether to involve non-faculty attorneys shall rest with the person who faces termination. If
the complainant chooses to engage a non-faculty attorney for the hearing, the University shall be obliged to provide an attorney for the respondents to the complaint.

... With the recommendations to be reported at the October 1991 meeting, and

WHEREAS, the entire procedures for operation of the Committee on Faculty Welfare and Privileges now are being reviewed by the Committee on Committees and Nominations, and

WHEREAS, the resolution of March 11 is included within the later charge, be it therefore

RESOLVED, that the University Faculty Senate amends the timing of the charge of March 11, 1991 to the date of the report of the review of all of the procedures for the Committee on Faculty Welfare and Privileges.

C. Recommendation from the Committee on Committees and Nominations (J. Olson, Chairperson) amending the Faculty Handbook concerning the Committee on Instructional, Computing and Research Support Services.

RESOLVED, that the second paragraph of the charge to the Committee on Instructional, Computing and Research Support Services, as it appears in Section I-III, page I-19 of the Faculty Handbook be amended as follows:

The Committee on Instructional, Computing and Research Support Services shall consist of one faculty member from each of the colleges of the University, one of whom shall be appointed as chairperson; an undergraduate student; a graduate student; a designee of the Director of the Library; a designee of the Associate Provost for Instructional Technology; and a designee of the Associate Vice President for Computing and Network Services.

D. Such items as may come before the Senate. (No motion introduced under new business, except a motion to refer to committee, shall be acted upon until the next meeting of the Senate.)

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Attachments:
1. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment
2. Guidelines for Reduction and Elimination of Programs

1Previously Associate Provost for Academic Computing and Instructional Technology.
REPORT OF THE UNIVERSITY FACULTY SENATE

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON DIVESTMENT

APRIL 8, 1991

Professor David Colton, Mathematical Sciences (Chairperson)
Professor Wunyabari Maloba, History
Professor Mark Miller, Political Science
Professor Ludwig Mosberg, Educational Studies
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1. INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 1985 the University Faculty Senate voted on a resolution brought before it by an Ad Hoc Committee on University Investments in South Africa. That resolution recommended that the University divest itself from the ownership of all stocks in corporations with operations in South Africa. The resolution was approved by the Senate and forwarded to the University Board of Trustees. The Board did not adopt this recommendation, but rather continued its 1979 policy which committed the University actively to encourage companies with operations in South Africa in which the University owns common stock to follow the so-called "Sullivan Principles" or simply "The Statement of Principles" as they were referred to in the Board's 1988 policy statement. (The Sullivan Principles, since renounced by their promulgator, comprise a voluntary code of conduct for corporations with subsidiary operations in South Africa.) In addition, the Board's current policy commits the University to "Adopt programs of its own to improve primary, secondary, university, vocational and technical education to help integrate blacks into the South African economy on the basis of equality" (see Appendix B).

In the intervening years, discussion of the University position on divestment has continued; economic sanctions against South Africa have become U.S. and United Nations policy, and political developments have occurred in South Africa in relation to apartheid. In response to continued controversy concerning the
University policy on divestment among various segments of the University community, the University Faculty Senate decided to formally re-visit this question and, thus, established the present Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment. The charge to this committee included 1) to review University policy toward apartheid; 2) to hold hearings in order to solicit the various views on this issue from the University community; and 3) to make appropriate recommendations to the Faculty Senate.

To accomplish these tasks the Committee undertook a study of the political and economic history of apartheid, the sanctions movement and its resulting political and economic effects, and the history of events at the University of Delaware in relation to apartheid and divestment. In addition, the Committee solicited the views of various segments of the University community and held an open hearing to which the entire University community was invited and encouraged to participate.

This report is an attempt to summarize the results of our efforts and concludes by making a recommendation for consideration by the University Faculty Senate.
2. BACKGROUND OF THE DIVESTMENT ISSUE

The predicament of the non-white majority population of South Africa has long been the object of international concern. By the 1960's, internal and international opposition to the apartheid system increased. Decolonization and the growing influence of anti-apartheid forces within the British Commonwealth nations contributed to South Africa's diplomatic isolation. In the United States the civil rights movement and the emergence of African and Black Studies programs on many campuses helped foster awareness of the South African situation.

Divestment and related anti-apartheid policies first became a significant issue for the 3,331 institutions of higher learning in the U.S., of which 2,025 are four-year universities and colleges, in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising of 1976. The killing, maiming and mass arrests of black students protesting educational policies, particularly the Afrikaans language requirement, prompted world-wide indignation. While a few U.S. universities had experienced anti-apartheid protests in the late sixties, such as at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, it was the widely-publicized violence associated with the Soweto uprising that spurred an international reaction. In 1977, the U.N. adopted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and the Carter Administration announced restrictions on the sale of goods to South
Africa. Divestment and related anti-apartheid policies emerged as an issue in the context of world-wide moral outrage and reaction. The British Commonwealth countries, the member states of the European Communities and of the Arab League would eventually join the U.S. in taking punitive steps against South Africa.

In March of 1977, 12 U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa announced their adherence to the Sullivan Principles. By 1979 the list of such U.S. corporations had grown to 119, including most of the major U.S. firms with operations in South Africa. Of the 175 U.S. colleges and universities surveyed by IRRC (Investor Responsibility Research Center) by 1979, 25 had divested in some manner, particularly from banks making loans to South Africa, and most of these institutions adopted policies tied to the Sullivan Principles.

Anti-apartheid activities on U.S. campuses appeared to wane in the early years of the Reagan Administration. However, by 1984 a new cycle of violence associated with South Africa's plans to inaugurate a multiracial parliament which excluded the black majority prompted a new outburst of campus activism and adoption of anti-apartheid policies. The surge in divestments by U.S. colleges and universities in 1985 was clearly linked to the worsening situation in South Africa. In 1985 alone more institutions of higher learning divested than in the previous eight
years. A total of 100 institutions had partially or totally
divested by 1985 (partial divestment typically means to divest from
companies which do not comply with the Sullivan Principles). About
half of the colleges and universities adopting new or revised
policies pertaining to South Africa in the mid-1980's opted for
total divestment.

The upsurge in divestment and related anti-apartheid policies
adopted in the mid-1980's responded to a groundswell of student and
faculty concern and activism. Of those institutions responding to
the IRRC survey and which adopted divestment or related policies,
some 70 percent cited student activism as a factor influencing the
policies. However, 20 percent of the respondents stated that
events in South Africa were the sole contributing factor to the
decisions to divest wholly or partially. A number of college and
university administrations decided to take action against apartheid
despite apathetic or disinterested student bodies and faculties.
In a number of instances, faculty anti-apartheid initiatives appear
to have influenced college or university policies more than student
activism. By 1985, according to the IRRC, about $400 million in
investments had been divested or committed to be divested. This
figure represented a little over 1 percent of the total value of
college and university endowments, estimated to be almost $33
billion in mid-1984. Among the 100 institutions with the largest
endowments, 40 had at least partially divested their portfolios by
115 1985 and 7 had adopted total divestment policies. By August of
116 1988, according to The Africa Fund, a total of 155 U.S. and
117 Canadian colleges and universities had divested $5,230,748,133.

118 The progress of divestment and related anti-apartheid policies
119 appears to have slowed since the mid-1980's although a significant
120 number of colleges and universities have opted to divest wholly or
121 partially since the 1985 high water mark. IRRC believes that
122 recent events in South Africa have slowed the mid-1980's crescendo
123 of divestments.

124 Divestment clearly has been adopted as a policy at a minority of
125 U.S. colleges and universities. The over 1,000 community colleges
126 appear to have been unaffected by the issue. Southern universities
127 and those across the Mississippi (except in Iowa, Minnesota,
128 Washington, Oregon and a few southwestern locations) have not
129 divested. Northeastern and upper midwestern colleges and
130 universities have evidenced the greatest propensity to divest. In
131 addition to a regional variation in divestment attitudes, it also
132 should be noted that the divestment and related anti-apartheid
133 policies adopted are highly variable, ranging from total divestment
134 and a corollary injunction against receiving gifts or grants from
135 corporations which do business in South Africa to partial or phased
136 divestment.
In some instances, colleges and universities were constrained to adopt divestment policies to conform to state laws barring investment and other business or financial dealings with South Africa. Public universities and liberal arts colleges with relatively small endowments were found by the IRRC survey to demonstrate the highest proclivity to divest. However, it is equally clear that bellwether institutions which traditionally have exhibited leadership in U.S. higher education, such as Harvard University, have also demonstrated a high proclivity to divest.

A number of institutions responding to the IRRC survey had, in effect, divested but did not wish to be considered as having divested. U.S. colleges and universities clearly feared that divestment policies would adversely affect corporate and alumni giving. It was also feared that divestment would be economically costly. However, the IRRC survey found little evidence of a corporate backlash against colleges and universities which had divested. And alumni appear to be largely indifferent to the divestment issue, although some alumni of the University of Chicago have started a campaign to contribute to a fund withheld from the University of Chicago as a way of pressuring that institution to divest. So many U.S. colleges and universities have successfully divested, including a number with a high percentage of their total endowments invested in companies doing business in South Africa,
that the economic arguments made against divestment back in the late 1970's appear less credible today than they once did.

In the late 1970's, adherence to the Sullivan Principles represented an alternative to divestment at many colleges and universities. Indeed, the Sullivan Principles option undoubtedly slowed the pace of divestment. A number of institutions committed to divest if the internal situation within South Africa had not evolved within the time limits set by the Reverend Sullivan. Since the expiration of that time period and the Reverend Sullivan's conclusion that his approach had not worked, it is unclear how colleges and universities which once relied on adherence to the Sullivan Principles as the keystone of their anti-apartheid policies have reacted.

Representative leaders of the majority population in South Africa and U.S. Department of State officials concur that divestment has adversely affected South Africa and has brought pressure to bear on the government to initiate political reforms. Hence, while adherence to the Sullivan Principles no longer makes sense as an anti-apartheid policy option in that the Reverend Sullivan himself has recognized their futility, there is ample reason to believe that the divestment policies of a minority of U.S. colleges and universities have been more than symbolic acts. Divestment remains an option for U.S. colleges and universities which thus far have
eschewed it, in that recent events in South Africa have not yet eventuated in the adoption of a genuinely democratic constitution. The question today is whether those U.S. colleges and universities which have not divested will heed calls for divestment from representative South African leaders and the international community at a time when the South African government had taken a number of steps aimed at improving its international image, ending its diplomatic isolation and, most recently, abolishing apartheid.

3. THE DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

The University of Delaware was not immune to the international movement against apartheid. By the late 1970's, the embryo of an anti-apartheid movement had developed on campus. There were marches, protests, and, in 1985, a Faculty Senate vote in support of divestment.

Citing its adherence to the Sullivan Principles, the Board of Trustees and the administration maintained its opposition to divestment. Indeed, the University maintained that divestment would adversely affect the non-white majority population and that such symbolic gestures were of little genuine import anyway. The administration also announced a program to bring qualified South African students to the University of Delaware as an alternative to divestment.
The University's stand against divestment was buttressed by a questionable analysis of the South African situation. The bold assertion that divestment would hurt the majority population was less than compelling in view of the suffering and deprivations endured for decades by the non-white majority. Pro-divestment forces took particular umbrage at this assertion when authoritative research, such as the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in South Africa subsequently published as *Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge*, co-authored by Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele, was drawing a diametrically opposite conclusion. The University defended its policy with an analysis identifiable with the oft quoted viewpoints of Chief Buthelezi of the Inkatha movement. From the perspective of the pro-divestment forces, the pain of the Trustees not accepting the Faculty Senate recommendation was compounded by the public defense made of the policy. It was partisan, arguably misinformed and, for many who care about the intellectual and moral leadership role of a university, a major source of concern. It seemed as if certain Trustees were dictating policy for the University and many wondered about the appropriateness of this state of affairs.

Pro-divestment activities, including periodic marches and protests, therefore continued. Student and faculty support for divestment waxed and waned as a function of events in South Africa, but at
least a significant minority of students and faculty continued to press for divestment in the face of inflexible adherence to the Sullivan Principles, even long after those principles were renounced as inadequate and ineffective by the Reverend Sullivan himself. Undeterred by the awkwardness of continuing to embrace the Sullivan Principles, the University persisted in portraying its refusal to divest as based upon well-informed analysis of the situation and in accord with the long-term interests of the non-white majority. Indeed, to the considerable consternation of some, its anti-divestment stand was equated with taking the moral high ground.

All of this was fuel on the fire. In the second half of the 1980's, minority students and faculty played a growing role in the anti-apartheid movement. The University's stand on divestment increasingly appeared to be insensitive to minority concerns and to render a university with a less than distinguished record in minority recruitment less congenial. University policy on divestment appeared to many to be difficult to reconcile with a new University focus on diversity and multiculturalism. Despite the professed and undoubtedly sincere condemnation of apartheid by the University, there remained a gulf of skepticism that could only be bridged by a clear and unequivocal condemnation of apartheid through divestment. By the late 1980's, support for divestment for
many within and outside the University had become a defining
feature of a genuinely multicultural university.

4. SANCTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS

The Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986 is by far the most
significant symbol of disapproval by the United States of the
policy of apartheid (on file in Morris Library and the University
Faculty Senate Office). It represents a significant departure from
past practices that made South Africa count on the United States
and western Europe for economic and diplomatic support. The 1986
Act was passed over the objections of President Reagan who, until
the last minute, still looked at P. W. Botha's government as "a
reformist administration" intent on dismantling racial
discrimination. The debates that led to the 1986 Act clearly
demonstrated that the Reagan Administration's policy of
"constructive engagement" had been a failure--it had failed to
induce the South African government to vigorously pursue a policy
of dismantling apartheid in its various forms.

The 1986 Act¹, among other things, proscribed the import to the
United States of South African goods, e.g., krugerrands, uranium,
coal, iron and agricultural products. There was also a ban on the

¹U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News 1986, No. 1
(Public Law 99-631).
export of some advanced technology to South Africa, especially in computers and nuclear technology. Arms trade, oil and petroleum goods were also banned. In finance, the Act banned United States investments in South Africa and restricted South Africa's access to international loans.

In 1986 the opponents of the bill against apartheid, including Chester Crocker of the Reagan Administration, argued that sanctions would prove to be counter-productive. They also argued that sanctions would hurt Africans in South Africa more than whites. In Europe, Margaret Thatcher's familiar phrase continued to be that "sanctions don't work." Four years after the bill was passed, it is important to review its effects on South African society.

In the first instance, this Act was and is significant because it symbolically denied South African government a ready source of diplomatic support in the United States and Europe, which in the past had made it react with disdain to all appeals to dismantle apartheid. It showed South Africa that there was no longer an automatic support and defense of its policies on the international scene. Perhaps more crucial was that this Act not only condemned apartheid, but also implemented sanctions as a measure to induce

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change in South Africa. In the past condemnations had lacked "the
teeth" to bite into South Africa's economics and politics.

Sanctions imposed by the United States and similar ones adopted by
the European Communities have caused the white rulers to seriously
reevaluate their country's policies. They have been forced to face
the reality of the eventual demise of apartheid in its various
forms. What signals have come from South Africa since 1986 to
demonstrate the efficacy of the 1986 Act?

Clearly, the most important event in this regard was the release
from detention of Nelson Mandela, in February 1990. His release
was preceded by the staggered release of other veteran nationalists
including Mbeki and Sisulu. Mandela's release was accompanied by
the government's proclamation lifting the ban on most political
parties including the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist
Congress, the South African Communist Party, etc. These parties
can now legally function openly in South Africa.

Since the release of Mandela from detention last year, the
government of South Africa under de Klerk has engaged in sporadic
exploratory discussions with the African National Congress
leadership in what has been termed "discussions about discussions."
Although not far reaching, these gestures in themselves demonstrate
that the minority government has realized that politics as usual is no longer tenable.

It is, however, on this question of politics and political rights that much work has yet to be done. A significant concern of this Committee has been the question of politics and economic structure of South Africa as it affects the Africans—the majority population. Without this concern, it is self-evident that this Committee would not exist.

This Committee is aware that there have been attempts in Europe and the United States to repeal the sanctions levelled against South Africa as "a reward to de Klerk's government" for some of the actions taken since last year. Nonetheless, we are equally aware that apartheid is still in place and that, in spite of recent pronouncements from South Africa, the basic question of political rights for Africans has not been addressed. Why then should economic sanctions, which include divestment, be maintained?

In the first instance, a very strong case can be made that, without economic sanctions, the South African government will not feel impelled to engage in serious negotiations with the African leadership to end apartheid. This, after all, is the principal lesson of the past five years. In other African countries where majority populations have been involved in struggles for
liberation, they have forced colonial forces to the negotiating table because of their military success on the field. This has certainly been true in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In South Africa, none of the liberation movements has a comparable leverage. Only the African National Congress had a significant armed wing, "Umkhonto we Sizwe." It, however, suspended armed struggle last year and so, in essence, does not have an internal or external military option to force de Klerk's government to negotiate seriously. Sanctions and their effect on both whites and blacks are the only serious weapon that the African National Congress and other liberation movements have at the moment.

Economic sanctions continue to serve another important political function: to communicate to the Africans in South Africa that the international community has not abandoned them in their quest for freedom and dignity. Sanctions serve as a rallying point of solidarity with Africans at a very difficult period in their country's history.

The Committee also notes with interest that the African leaders in South Africa still see a need for sanctions. On February 2, 1991, one day after de Klerk announced that he would repeal some of the basic laws of apartheid, Nelson Mandela called on the international community to maintain economic sanctions against South Africa. Mandela reminded the world that Africans still had no vote and that
"the state organs are still dominated by whites."\(^3\) Besides, the past practices of apartheid have "left so many blacks burdened with poverty and illiteracy that they will be hard put to use any new opportunities."\(^4\) The process of change to which economic sanctions have made a significant contribution is likely to be halted or stagnated, with all the unwelcome consequences, if the government of South Africa perceives that the international community has started to relax in its demands on the dissolution of apartheid. Indeed, if this were to happen, the overwhelming majority of Africans in the country may opt for non-peaceful strategies which would render the peace process tragically irrelevant.

The Committee feels that continued economic sanctions will hasten the end of apartheid. In urging this action, we note that only this outcome can lead to an immediate redress of the immense economic problems now facing many South Africans, especially the African majority. Problems of poverty, illiteracy, poor or no housing, landlessness, and unemployment are critical, and yet they cannot be solved within the context of apartheid. This problem of poverty and hopelessness is especially true of the youth, millions of young men and women who now have no employment and are not in

\(^3\) *The New York Times*, (February 3, 1991) p. 3.

school. They comprise what *Time* magazine has called "the lost generation"\(^5\) (see Appendix C).

The spirit and intent of the 1986 Act was to "apply economic pressure to the apartheid structure as a means of wrestling political change from its government."\(^6\) It is the Committee's view that as long as universal franchise is absent, it is premature to say that significant and irreversible political change has occurred in South Africa.

5. CLARITY ON THE DIVESTMENT ISSUE

We have previously discussed how apartheid became an issue on which American universities, and in particular the University of Delaware, have been asked to take a position. The divestment movement (and events in South Africa!) has forced universities to take a stronger stand than merely condemning apartheid. The University of Delaware's response has basically been to offer a small number of scholarships to South African students, all of whom must receive exit and re-entry permits from the South African government. The University has publicly refused to divest. The majority of other universities in the region have either divested (Drexel University, Lincoln University, University of Maryland,


\(^6\)Thomas J. Redden, Jr., op. cit. p. 596.
Rutgers University, Temple University) or partially divested (Bryn Mawr College, Haverford College, Johns Hopkins University, University of Pennsylvania, Swathmore College). The Board of Trustees of the University of Delaware has rejected divestment for a number of reasons, not all of which are clear to this Committee (see Appendix D). In order for the faculty of the University to come to an informed decision on what its own views are, it appears to this Committee that the following questions need to be addressed:

1. Has divestment ever been, particularly at present, an effective policy in bringing about change in South Africa?

2. Instead of divesting from South Africa should we not instead be investing in helping to educate black South Africans?

3. Doesn't divestment hurt the very people we are trying to help, i.e., black South Africans?

4. What effect does not divesting have on either the image of the University or on the goal of establishing a racially diverse campus?

While other questions can obviously be asked, clarity on these four points, in conjunction with the rest of this report, should enable
the faculty to make an informed choice on an issue that is of long-standing concern to the University.

We begin with the concept of divestment as a policy towards apartheid. The main goal of divestment is usually defined vaguely as to end transnational companies' support for apartheid. As such, it is part of the international sanctions movement against South Africa, the effectiveness of which we have previously discussed. It is important to recall that sanctions are a practical diplomatic tool, intended to apply political pressure, and not a sop to a guilty conscience. In particular, sanctions, and divestment more specifically, should be seen as "persuasive" rather than "punitive"—a means of bringing pressure to bear and so persuading the white minority of the necessity of entering into genuine negotiations. As far as divestment itself is concerned, the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa7 view it as an important component of the sanctions movement: "The withdrawal of private companies [from South Africa] has been one of the most significant non-government sanctions, probably second only to the ban on the rolling over of loans by banks." Even though many companies that were previously foreign-owned and obeyed codes of conduct have been sold to local managers who no longer follow the codes and have reduced their social investment, the Commonwealth Committee found that trade unions, in general, have

supported corporate withdrawal as a way of putting pressure on the apartheid state. The foreign ministers of the Commonwealth concluded their report with the following statement:

"For the white minority, negotiating fundamental change and giving up a monopoly on power will be a long, difficult and worrying process. It is a road that will be taken only when it is the only one available. Sanctions are essential to demonstrate that the option of reforming apartheid is too expensive and is internationally unacceptable. Sanctions are necessary to push Pretoria down the demanding path of genuine negotiation."

An argument commonly used against divestment is that instead of "washing our hands" of South Africa we should, as an educational institution, try to help black South Africans get a better education. Indeed, a version of this viewpoint is the major thrust of the 1988 Board of Trustees' resolution at the University of Delaware (see Appendix B). The Committee sees no contradiction in both divesting and aiding black education in South Africa, although one may question whether six tuition scholarships and one fellowship is a significant commitment by the University towards ending apartheid. However, a serious problem associated with efforts from abroad towards improving black education in South Africa is that the de Klerk government has refused to create a desegregated school system and indeed has stated that such a possibility is non-negotiable.8 Meanwhile, last year more than 200 white schools closed because there were not enough white pupils,

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while in black schools the teacher-student ratio is now 1:90; five
times more is spent on each white child than on each black child.9
Government proposals by which parents of children in all-white
schools may admit students of other races are so compromised as to
do nothing to begin to address the problem.10 Aside from calling
into question the South African government's commitment to the
ultimate establishment of a democratic state, such a policy towards
black education makes outside efforts rather ineffectual, to say
the least. Until there is a genuine movement towards educational
reform by the South African government, aid in the form of
scholarships or fellowships will be perceived by many as simply
tokenism, particularly since the South African government itself
has a role in the selection process. It is the view of this
Committee that even if such efforts are pursued this in no way
relieves the administration and faculty of the need to address the
specific issue of divestment in a forthright manner.

Perhaps the major argument against divestment is that by
withdrawing our moral pressure on companies doing business in South
Africa we are hurting the very people we are trying to help, i.e.,
black South Africans. This is an argument that has been used
repeatedly by both the South African government and the Board of

9The News Journal, op. cit.
10The Christian Science Monitor, August 3-9, 1990;
international edition.
Trustees at the University of Delaware. However, it is in fact the
leaders of black South Africans who are the very people who are
asking for sanctions. In particular, the African National
Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and the United Democratic
Front have all come out clearly and consistently for sanctions and
divestment. Bishop Tutu, the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize Winner and
Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, has been particularly firm in
dealing with the argument that sanctions would mostly hurt blacks:

"I hope that most who use this argument would just drop it
quietly and stop being so hypocritical. It is amazing how
everybody has become so solicitous for blacks and become
such wonderful altruists. It is remarkable that in South
Africa the most vehement in their concern for blacks have
been whites."

Of course, sanctions and divestment will hurt black South Africans
and black leaders know this. However, using 1986 figures, if all
directly owned American companies were to withdraw overnight (and
were not taken over by local managers), white unemployment would
rise from 5 percent to 8 percent whereas black unemployment would
rise from 25 percent to 26 percent, i.e., due to an extremely high
rate of black unemployment and the fact that American companies
only employ 1 percent of the black workforce, the effect of
sanctions falls more heavily on the white workforce than on the
black. It is for this reason that expression of concern for the
effect of sanctions on black workers falls on deaf ears for those
involved in the struggle for a democratic South Africa. Finally, the codes of conduct that have been increasingly adopted by U.S. companies (and endorsed by the Board of Trustees at the University of Delaware) as a way of staving off divestment have been widely rejected on two grounds. Firstly, they have failed even in their own terms to make significant changes and, secondly, they do nothing to end apartheid.11 Because of this, in 1987 the Reverend Leon Sullivan ended his support for the United States code named after him and called for companies to withdraw from South Africa.

There is one major black South African leader who has come out against sanctions and divestment and hence is widely quoted by those opposed to sanctions both inside and outside South Africa. This is Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland and President of Inkatha, his own political party cum militia. Since he is so often used as a voice of authority by opponents of divestment, perhaps it is worthwhile to quote at length from a recent book on the current struggle in South Africa:12

"Buthelezi's role is an unusual one. As Chief Minister of KwaZulu, the country's most populous homeland, he...has urged the movement to compromise on its demand for one person-one vote. Years ago, the government jumped him

over an older brother to make him chief of the Buthelezi subtribe, and ever since then it has installed him in successive positions on the way up the ladder to his present one. Pretoria subsidizes $80 million worth of KwaZulu's budget, and staffs key posts in its administration. For much of the 1980's, dozens of other black political organizations were banned from even having a meeting in someone's kitchen, but Pretoria has always happily allowed Buthelezi to address stadiums full of Inkatha faithful...Inkatha has borrowed the African National Congress colors of black, green, and gold. And when making speeches, Buthelezi denounces apartheid as vigorously as anyone. But none of this bothers shrewder heads in Pretoria—for if he did not do these things, they know, he would lose what limited credibility he has as an African leader, both at home and overseas. 'For white South Africa,' wrote the late Steve Biko, 'it is extremely important to have a man like Buthelezi speaking and sounding the way he is doing.'

An important issue the faculty must address when considering the issue of divestment is how divestment, or lack thereof, affects the efforts of the University to establish a more racially diverse campus. We report below on the opinions of black students, faculty and staff interviewed by this Committee. A survey taken by the University of Delaware African American Coalition in 1990 resoundly reaffirmed the Coalition's position in favor of divestment. Finally, the editorial in the The News Journal on December 12, 1990 (see Appendix E) is presumably reflective of how the University of Delaware's position on divestment is viewed by a significant portion of the citizens of the State. All of this evidence strongly indicates that the issue of divestment is intimately linked to the establishment of a racially harmonious environment on campus. It is the view of the Committee that such an environment can only be obtained if the University of Delaware is
seen to be enthusiastically on the side of black freedom rather than white privilege and this impresses a moral stance on the University's policy towards divestment. Perhaps, with faculty leadership, the Board of Trustees at the University of Delaware can follow the example of Allegheny College where in May, 1990, the Board of Trustees reversed a 1988 vote against divestment saying that a continuation of a non-divestment policy constituted a "serious impediment" to the development of a harmonious multi-racial environment at the college. However, regardless of what the Board of Trustees of this University does, it is both appropriate and timely for the faculty to step forward and be collectively heard on this issue. The Committee hopes that this report will be helpful towards this end.

6. CAMPUS VIEWS ON THE ISSUE OF DIVESTMENT

The Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment was established by the University Faculty Senate and charged as follows:

"The Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment shall review the policies of this University toward Apartheid, hold hearings where the University community may make its several views known, and report to the Senate appropriate recommendations for action of the University Senate."

In order to carry out this charge, the Committee sought the views from all appropriate segments of the University community,
including the Board of Trustees, University administration, faculty, professional staff and students. Invitations to meet with the Committee were extended to the Chairperson of the Board of Trustees, University President, Acting Provost, former Provost and University Treasurer. The Committee also extended invitations to members of the previous Senate Ad Hoc Committee on University Investments in South Africa, which made a recommendation to the Senate in 1985, and a number of campus groups which the Committee identified as possibly having a particular interest in the question of University policy toward apartheid and divestment.

Finally, the Committee scheduled an open hearing for the entire University community which encouraged all interested parties to present and discuss their views on this matter. It also encouraged individuals who could not attend or who did not wish to express their views in a public forum to communicate their views in writing directly to the Committee. The open hearing was held on December 5, 1990.

In the remainder of this section of the report, we attempt to summarize the main points of the various individuals and groups with whom we met as well as the discussion which took place at the open hearing. The transcript of the open hearing as well as all the written statements received from the University administration
and campus organizations are included in the appendices on file in Morris Library and the University Faculty Senate Office.

Results of Discussions with the University Administration

On September 28, 1990, the Committee invited Mr. Andrew Kirkpatrick, Chairperson of the Board of Trustees, to meet with the Committee at his convenience to discuss the University policy toward apartheid and divestment. Chairperson Kirkpatrick, in his letter of October 23, 1990, informed the Committee that he requested President Roselle, who also is a member of the Board of Trustees, to represent the Board at a meeting with the Committee.

The Committee requested meetings with President Roselle, Acting Provost Richard Murray, and Treasurer Robert Harrison. President Roselle agreed to meet with the Committee together with the Acting Provost and Treasurer. This meeting was held on November 16, 1990.

At this meeting, President Roselle reiterated the University policy adopted by the Board of Trustees which commits the University to limit its stock investments to corporations in compliance with the so-called Sullivan Principles and to adopt programs whose aim is to improve educational opportunities for black South Africans. He expressed his abhorrence to the policy of apartheid and indicated his belief that the University policy was a balanced and effective
means for the University to express its commitment to the abolition
of apartheid. He recognized that the University needs to do more
in terms of educational programs and that more faculty input is
necessary for this effort. A discussion with Acting Provost Murray
ensued concerning the present programmatic efforts of the
University. At present, these efforts consist of providing six
tuition scholarships and one fellowship for black South African
students. As is often the case at such meetings, time constraints
made it impossible to cover the entire agenda. Thus, at the
conclusion of the 1 1/2 hour meeting, President Roselle was asked
whether he would respond to written questions put to him by the
Committee. President Roselle agreed and, by a letter on November
30, 1990 (see Appendix D), the Committee submitted seven questions
which it deemed important for developing its understanding of the
Board of Trustees' policy. These questions concern the rationale
and evidential basis for the Board's policy, its investment
practices in regard to corporations with operations in South Africa
and the decision making structure for the University programmatic
educational policy in regard to South Africa. The President's
response (see Appendix D) indicated that it is not likely that the
Board of Trustees has a single position on these matters. Thus,
President Roselle was not able to significantly help the Committee
better understand the past or present basis of the Board's policy
position.
The Committee's questions regarding the University's investment practices were referred by President Roselle to Treasurer Harrison and through his office a good deal of data on the University stock investments in corporations with operations in South Africa since 1978 were supplied. This data indicates that, in 1978, 53.6 percent of the market value of the stock portfolio was in corporations with operations in South Africa. By 1985, 40.2 percent of the market value of the portfolio was in corporations with operations in South Africa and, by the end of 1990, this percentage had dropped to 20.2 percent. While the portfolio in 1978 included 27 corporations with South African operations, the 1990 portfolio contains seven such corporations, five of which date back to the 1978 portfolio. More than one-half of the others were sold and the remainder are still held but have quit operations in South Africa. Treasurer Harrison indicated that there has been no deliberate policy to divest but the trend is of interest nevertheless. It is clear to this Committee that at least partial divestment, intentional or not, has been occurring since 1978 without undue hardship and it appears likely that full divestment could be accomplished without adverse economic consequences.

Finally, the Committee's discussion with former Provost L. Leon Campbell was most helpful in clarifying much of the past University history on this issue and the relationship between the Board of Trustees and the University administration.
Results of Discussions with Campus Organizations

The Committee met with representatives of the Committee to Promote Racial and Cultural Diversity, Center for Black Culture, Black Student Union, Campus Coalition for Human Rights, African-American Coalition, College Democrats, and representatives of the former Faculty Senate Ad Hoc Committee on University Investments in South Africa. Other invited groups or individuals chose not, or were unable, to meet with the Committee. While the Committee met with each group separately, the views expressed shared a great deal of unanimity on the issues discussed. A number of these groups or individuals submitted written statements on their position. For purposes of this report, the major points raised in these discussions will be summarized.

There was unanimous agreement that divestment was an important moral and symbolic act in opposition to apartheid and, as such, the failure of the University to take this moral and symbolic step has significant negative effects on the perception of the University as unfriendly and insensitive (to say the least) toward minority members at a time when the University has set racial and cultural diversity as a goal. The University position on divestment, according to the views expressed to us, calls into serious question
the University's commitment to this goal as well as its moral
commitment to the freedom and equality of black South Africans.

Beyond the symbolic moral implications of divestment, it was the
unanimous view of these groups that divestment as part of the
sanctions movement has important economic and political
implications. There was little doubt in the minds of those with
whom we spoke that sanctions have played a major role in whatever
movement there has been in South Africa for negotiations and repeal
of many of the apartheid laws. There also was little doubt
expressed on the importance of maintaining sanctions and the
contribution that the University could and ought to make in this
regard by approving a policy of total divestment.

Finally, it also was a unanimously expressed view that the failure
of the University to divest has serious negative consequences for
recruiting and retaining African-American students and faculty.
The view was expressed that, while it is rare that a student or
faculty member will make his/her decision to come to Delaware
solely or primarily on the basis of the University's divestment
policy, it is nevertheless one of the major factors in creating an
overall impression of the institutionalized racial climate of the
University. This point of view was expressed repeatedly in no
uncertain terms.
Results of the Open Hearing

The open hearing attracted approximately 40 members of the University community and included faculty, professionals and students. The students, by and large, represented various student groups, some of whom had communicated with the Committee previously. Several of these individuals and groups submitted written statements for the record and those are included in the transcript of the hearing.

The views expressed at the hearing were strongly in support of divestment for most of the same reasons discussed previously. In addition, however, an opposing view was expressed by the representative of the College Republicans who argued that important steps are being taken by the South African government to dismantle apartheid and that further sanctions could impede the progress now being made. A second view opposed to University divestment was submitted in writing to the Committee arguing that the "...raising of educational standards for blacks and further advancement into the economic nexus of South Africa is the road for political weight and political participation." Further, "divestment of American firms in South Africa, which have been the leaders in seeking equal opportunities and equal wages for blacks, accomplishes nothing more than an indignant moral statement without weighing the consequences upon the poor."
An additional view was expressed that total University divestment, particularly the stock of DuPont, could have enormous economic impact on the University because of the close connection between important supporters of the University and the DuPont Company.

There also was a discussion of the faculty participation in CREF which invests in the stock of corporations with operations in South Africa. This issue, which also arose in our meetings with campus groups and former Provost Campbell, revolved around the questions of whether there were actions which the University community or individuals could take in opposition to apartheid independent of the actions of the Board of Trustees and whether it is hypocritical of faculty to urge divestment when they themselves are not divested by virtue of their participation in CREF. While there appeared to be support for the notion of independent action in lieu of the Board of Trustees' change in policy, it is a strongly held view that such independent action could not and should not be a substitute for a decision to divest as an institutional policy.

Conclusions from the Committee's Hearings

While the issue of divestment does not seem to be at the forefront of faculty or student concerns as it may have been a few years ago, it is nevertheless a very important issue to a large segment of the
University community and divestment has widespread support among both faculty and students as far as the Committee could determine. The issue is clearly of great importance to the minority community on- and off-campus and appears to have serious implications for the perception of the University in regard to racial and ethnic sensitivities and concerns. Further, it was clear from the Committee's interactions with the University community that the failure to divest is viewed by a large segment of the community as a failure of intellectual and moral leadership on the part of the University. This is further evidenced by recent editorials in both The Review and The News Journal (see Appendix D).

7. RESOLUTION

Based on our considered deliberations and our extensive consultations and, after having fully considered the significant political changes that have taken place in South Africa, we hereby recommend to the University Faculty Senate the adoption of the following resolution:

WHEREAS, the University of Delaware continues to deplore the policy of apartheid still practiced in South Africa, and
WHEREAS, the University of Delaware has the moral and intellectual responsibility to provide leadership in opposition to this abhorrent policy, and

WHEREAS, divestment has proven to be an effective weapon against apartheid in South Africa, and

WHEREAS, a fundamental and irreversible rupture with apartheid policy has not yet occurred, and taking note of the continuing calls for sanctions by organizations representative of the majority of South Africa's people, and

WHEREAS, considering that the suspension of armed struggle in South Africa makes economic pressure against apartheid all the more significant at this historic juncture, be it

RESOLVED, that the University Faculty Senate of the University of Delaware recommend that the officers and trustees of the University divest the University of stocks, bonds and other holdings in all corporations that have operations in South Africa.
### UNIVERSITY HOLDINGS OF COMPANIES WITH OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

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$ 29.7 million

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Legend:
- Less than
- NA: Not Available
- *: Held only in Evans Fund
- **: 1987 Data
WHEREAS, the University of Delaware entered into agreements with Solar Energy Systems, Inc., whereby the Institute of Energy Conversion would conduct research on solar energy for terrestrial use for Solar Energy Systems, Inc., and

WHEREAS, Solar Energy Systems, Inc. agreed, among other matters, to repay to the University funds expended by the University for such research, and

WHEREAS, the Executive Committee at a special meeting on December 8, 1973, resolved that such repayments were to be placed in a Designated Loan Fund for use as authorized by the Trustees,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that such funds repaid by Solar Energy Systems, Inc. are to be used for the purchase of capital equipment of the Institute of Energy Conversion in accordance with existing Trustee Budget and Financial Policies and Procedures.

WHEREAS, the Committee on Finance has adopted a position on University investments with respect to the impact of those investments on the policy of apartheid in South Africa; and

WHEREAS, the Committee on Finance has found that the existing investments are consistent with the principles of The Reverend Leon Sullivan with respect to human rights in South Africa and with a policy of providing a return on investments which is in the best interest of the University; and

WHEREAS, the Committee on Finance at its meeting on April 24, 1979 did hear from the representatives on the Committee Against Investment in South Africa and considered their written and oral presentation and following that meeting did reaffirm their existing position,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Executive Committee be and hereby does support the Committee on Finance with respect to University investments and its position in this area as expressed in the paper entitled, "University of Delaware Committee on Finance Report on Position with Respect to University Holdings of Companies with Operations in South Africa," dated May 1, 1979.
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

REPORT ON POSITION WITH RESPECT TO UNIVERSITY

HOLDINGS OF COMPANIES WITH OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The Committee on Finance of the Board of Trustees of the University of Delaware has considered the issues involved in the roles of U.S. corporations with operations in South Africa and U.S. banks that make loans to South Africa. It has done this in the context of examining the roles of such corporations and banks in which the University owns stocks. The following paragraphs reflect the facts and rationale utilized by the Committee to determine its position on the matter.

First of all, about 350 American companies have operations in South Africa. They employ 90,000 people in their workforce, 60,000 of whom are blacks. The book value of all these companies amounts to about $1.6 billion, representing 16% of the total foreign investment in that country and 4% of the total investment in the South African economy.

From the beginning of our deliberations we recognized that the issue was two-fold: (1) social, cultural and economic conditions that exist and the impact that American investment has on these factors, and (2) political -- the country has been, and today is, completely controlled by the present South African Government. Foreign corporations have no real influence on this Government and its political policies -- nor should they.

When one looks at the options the University of Delaware has in dealing with its investments in companies doing business in South Africa, they appear to be as follows:

1. Do nothing.

   It was felt that such a course would not be responsive to the basic issue of South African apartheid.

2. Sell our holdings in companies who are now or intend to be invested in South Africa.

   To prudent members of the Committee on Finance, this alternative did not appear financially or legally sound or constructive as it would not assure positive results, but would risk losses in the University's portfolio through such arbitrary sales.

3. Ascertaining that companies operating in South Africa in which the University has holdings have positive programs to improve the condition of their black employees and Black society in general.

   This course seemed to have the most merit and could be handled best by getting assurances from the companies that they would or had already adopted the "Sullivan Principles" (which over a hundred companies have embraced to date) or their equivalent.

The University owns stocks of 25 companies that have operations in South Africa or that make loans to South Africa. Eighteen of these have formally adopted the "Sullivan Principles." The remaining seven companies have provided the University information on their policies. These policies are considered to be equivalent to the "Sullivan Principles."
Adopted Sullivan Principles

- American Home Products
- Bristol-Myers
- Caterpillar Tractor
- Chase Manhattan
- Citicorp
- Deere & Co.
- Eastman Kodak
- Exxon
- Ford Motor Co.
- General Electric
- General Motors
- IBM
- Merck & Co.
- Minnesota Mining
- Norton Simon
- Revlon
- Squibb
- Warner-Lambert

Adopted Policies Equivalent to the Sullivan Principles

- Chesebrough-Pond's
- Coca-Cola
- Continental Illinois Corp.
- Dun & Bradstreet
- Ingersoll-Rand
- Kimberly Clark
- PepsiCo.

Information has been gathered from many sources on the issues described above. The information shows a growing acceptance of the Rev. Sullivan's principles -- not only by American corporations, but by African leaders. Examples of results from certain studies follows:

Mr. Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., President of the National Urban League, has studied the problem, including visits to South Africa, where he has had numerous discussions with African leaders. In several of his reports he has stated: "The black South Africans I talked to don't want to see (those) jobs leave the country; they are needed by black people who have few economic opportunities, and I was told that if the Americans pull out they will be replaced by European and Japanese firms less amenable to social responsibility."

In still another report, Mr. Jordan states: "The black South Africans I met were unequivocal in their opinion that American corporations should not withdraw from South Africa. They told me they need the jobs those corporations bring, but they also told me those corporations should make better use of their economic clout to pierce the walls of apartheid."

Mr. Jordan said he not only supports the Sullivan Principles and the potential role American corporations can play in continuing to be a positive force for social improvement but he personally is strongly opposed to withdrawal.

Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of South Africa's $7 billion Anglo American Corporation group, has been an outspoken critic of that Government's ethnic policies. He believes the way to defeat race discrimination in his country lies in more, not less, investment in the South African economy by the U.S. and other nations.

He points out that more than 40% of South Africa's population is less than 14 years of age, a percentage higher than India and Brazil, and, of course, much higher than the U.S. To absorb new entrants into the labor market, South Africa will have to create about 1,400 jobs every working day from 1980 to 2000. To come any-
where near accommodating these job needs, the gross domestic product must grow at a rate in excess of 5.1% per year. That growth today is under 3%.

Mr. Oppenheimer also states that to call for higher wage rates and the end of racial discrimination in industry, while at the same time seeking to deny South Africa the capital inflow which is necessary in order to offer these conditions to the majority of the people, involves "muddled thinking, if not intellectual dishonesty."

Many colleges and universities have given special attention to the position their investment committees and Boards of Trustees should take on this matter. For example, Columbia, Princeton and Swarthmore have followed the same indepth analysis as has the Committee on Finance of the University of Delaware. They and a number of others have adopted the same position as the Committee on Finance of the University of Delaware — that support of the Sullivan Principles is the best on balance of all the options available.

Revised 5/1/79
WHEREAS, it is important to the University of Delaware to respond to the rebuff of apartheid and the needs of blacks in South Africa, and

WHEREAS, the total withdrawal of businesses conducted by international companies in South Africa and the imposition of sanctions on South Africa by all countries may contribute to worsening of the conditions of South African blacks, and

WHEREAS, the University owns common stock of American companies which abide by the statement of principles and it is felt that these signatory companies have a positive impact on the civil rights and economic and living conditions of some blacks in South Africa, and

WHEREAS, there is considerable need for improvement of the educational opportunities of black South Africans.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the University will:

1. Continue to support the statement of principles by encouraging companies with operations in South Africa to maintain a high rating in implementing social responsibility projects, including activities to help eliminate laws and customs that impede the attainment of political, economic and social justice by blacks.

2. Adopt programs of its own to improve primary, secondary, university, vocational and technical education to help integrate blacks into the South African economy on the basis of equality, including:

a. granting of scholarships by the University through the U.S. - South African Education Program.

b. encouraging students to raise funds for scholarships.

c. encouraging churches, foundations and all firms that conduct business with South Africa to provide assistance for education of South African blacks.

d. developing faculty/student exchange programs involving South African educational institutions.

e. taking leadership as a member of the consortium of 47 universities to encourage direct representation to the South African government to promote adoption of a unitary educational system and the end of apartheid.
f. supporting educational aid programs of the U.S. government and encouraging other governments, especially Japan, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada to expand funding for the development of professional and technical skills of blacks in South Africa.

3. Take action as appropriate to help insure equality of opportunity at U.S. colleges and universities and thereby demonstrate to South Africans that integrated educational institutions work in a just, fair and efficient manner in achieving their fundamental mission of teaching, public service and research.
The Lost Generation
Apartheid's sad legacy: millions of black youth, unequipped for the future

By SCOTT MACLEOD JOHANNESBURG

H e says to call him "Che Guevara." He lives in Zola, one of the inner-city districts that make up the vast black township of Soweto, outside Johannesburg. At 22 he is a hardened veteran of the struggle against apartheid. He has killed "enemies of the people" and is prepared to kill again.

Seven years ago he became a supporter of the then outlawed African National Congress. With other teenagers he started stoning police vehicles. When leaders of the liberation movement sought to make the townships ungovernable, he became one of the enforcers. If he caught a family paying rent to municipal authorities in defiance of the rent boycott, he would serve them with an eviction notice. "If they refused to go," he says, "we'd speak to them in the language of the struggle. We'd kill them and burn their house down."

There are millions of young men, some like Che, in South Africa, a country's lost generation. Nelson Mandela hailed black youth as the "Young Lions," who took over as the shock troops of the revolution while he and other aging black leaders were locked away in prison. The "comrades," as they called themselves, battled the state's security forces for control of the townships, rooted out informers and sellouts, and spearheaded worker stay-aways and consumer boycotts. It was their militancy and surging growth, as much as anything else, that finally convinced the white government in Pretoria that apartheid's days were numbered.

Freedom has come for Mandela, and it may be nearing for all blacks who long to rule in their own land. But the youth are emerging as apartheid's saddest and potentially most dangerous legacy: as many as 5 million young people, from their early 20s down to perhaps 10, mostly school dropouts who are unable to get jobs and unprepared to make constructive contributions to society. They are the depraved, ambitious, lawless, or thieves. They live in bleak urban townships, where the standard four-room house shelters an average of 10 people. They are often murderous supporters of rival groups like the A.N.C., the Pan Africanist Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. What unites them is lives that have known little besides political conflict. When the day of liberation comes, what will they do? They have learned all too well how to imitate the violence of a state that has often used live ammunition on defenseless protesters and fired tear gas to disperse groups of small children. They have lived in a world, says the Rev. Frank Chikane, head of the South African Council of Churches, "of military operations and night raids, of roadblocks and body searches, where friends and parents get carried away in the middle of the night."

The fiery images of death have become part of their normal experience. Many of them, in the words of Drum magazine editor Barney Cohen, are capable of killing at the drop of a match. They have developed a youth culture of alienation and intolerance that may be more destructive, in its sheer scale, than anything seen in Beirut, Belfast or the Gaza Strip.
Apartheid, by robbing black community and family life of all authority and cohesion, is to blame. But so, to some extent, is the type of fight that blacks chose to wage against white oppression. For years parents have been standing back while their children moved to the front trenches of the freedom struggle.

The youth rebellion began on June 16, 1976, when the schoolchildren of Soweto, seething over the inferior instruction known as Bantu education, rose in protest against the state's edict that their lessons must be learned in Afrikaans, the language of the ruling whites. The initial battles left more than 400 dead, but the uprising was never completely quelled. In 1984 the comrades of the still simmering townships rebelled again, setting off a series of violent protests that killed more than 2,000 over the next two years and prompted the government to impose a state of emergency. The turmoil presented Pretoria with grave political problems, including the imposition of stronger international sanctions, which President F.W. de Klerk is still trying to solve.

But the endless conflict also helped transform black children. As the youth population mushroomed, so did its power to do violence. Now there are 28.5 million blacks in the country, half of them under the age of 14, many of them with no notion of how to live in a peaceful world. Black parents are frustrated at their inability to get their children to return to school. “Liberation now; education later” became the slogan of the 1980s, but it only promises to make the 1990s that much harder.

Spending its days in the streets, the lost generation alarms many black community leaders as much as it does white government officials. Perhaps half the urban youth eschew political activism, preferring to loaf, play soccer, drink beer and shoot dice. Thousands upon thousands of others are caught up in the chaos. Activists say they roam the townships like so many deputy sheriffs, enforcing the law with harsh punishment.

Although the practice has died down recently, teenage judges preside over so-called people's courts that almost casually handed out death sentences to suspected traitors. A youth invention that has not disappeared is “necklacing,” the method of mob execution in which a gasoline-doused rubber tire is thrown around a suspected traitor's body and set ablaze.

“Chris,” 26, has no interest in working and little time for politics. He is too busy stealing. He started with cars, moved on to breaking into houses in the affluent white suburbs and eventually to armed robbery.

He claims that he would never kill for money. But he admits that he has killed out of revenge. After burying a friend who had been murdered, he and a gang of comrades armed with pangas went on their own after the youth they suspected of the killing. “We chopped him up,” Chris says. “His head was over here. His hands were over there.”

Black crime is soaring. Poverty has removed the stigma from stealing. And young people are no longer afraid of the police. Blacks have invented a name for the new youthful criminals: they are the constumers, gangstas masquerading as political activists. In Soweto, which has 3 million residents, an epidemic of car thefts and armed holdups has left many people cowering in their homes after sunset. The township ranks among the murder capitals of the world: in 1989 Soweto reported 1,383 killings, compared with 1,900 in New York City and 434 in Washington.

Gangs conduct classes for young boys in the fine arts of car theft and burglary. They use Soviet-made AK-47 assault rifles to carry out bank robberies and payroll heists. Much of this crime is vicious. A bunch of street toughs recently murdered an elderly New Zealand tourist and stole his wristwatch after he made a wrong turn and wound up in Soweto after dark. “This is because black people are suffering,” a black burglar told a white Johannesburg man as he robbed his house and raped a woman friend.

The most worrisome trend is the readiness of young white activists to kill each other. In the province of Natal alone, more than 4,000 people have died
since clashes erupted in 1986 between followers of the A.N.C. and the Zulu-based Inkatha movement, headed by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Instead of inspiring a new era of peace, Mandela's return has seen the fighting spread to Soweto and other townships encircling Johannesburg. In 1990 nearly 3,500 were killed in black communal violence, the worst year's toll in modern South African history.

Prince, 54, steered clear of politics to take advantage of economic opportunities opening up for blacks. He became a bank teller—until his world collapsed in 1983 when the bank was robbed by a group of his friends and police accused him of being the inside man.

After serving four years in prison, Prince is trying to build a future for himself. But he is filled with resentment when he sees the stark contrasts between black Alexander township and the nearby white suburb of Sandton. "Even if you are blindfolded, you know you are in Alex by the smell," he says. "But get in your car, and in five minutes—look at the mansions, smell the flowers, see the BMWs and the overflowing grocery trolleys in the supermarkets. It can make you cry."

The dormant A.N.C. Youth League is being revived to bring the comrades under the movement's umbrella. The league's slogan—Fight! Produce! Learn!—echoes the mixed signals that A.N.C. leaders are sending to the youth. Mandela has been urging them to go back to school, but the A.N.C. still employs young students in boycotts that keep them in the streets.

Worse, the mass-action campaign includes attacks on black municipal councillors and black policemen—part of apartheid's crumbling system—that encourage the perpetuation of black-against-black violence. In 1990 there were more than 400 recorded attacks on black councillors and policemen, resulting in at least 25 deaths. How will the young react when black politicians and police are representing a black government?

These militant strategies may keep youths motivated for the cause, but they do little to prepare them for a painful reality ahead. The "new South Africa," as Mandela and De Klerk both like to call it, may in many ways be as bad or worse than the old.

B lack will have the vote and a right to equal opportunity. The new political system will presumably be a democracy. The black middle class of entrepreneurs, lawyers and other professionals that has sprung up under apartheid will grow. There is a reasonable chance for racial harmony, since even the most militant blacks accept the right of whites to be fellow South Africans.

But the huge economic disparities between whites and blacks will continue for years. A majority of South Africa's blacks are desperately poor: at least 7 million live in destitute squatter camps. They will see few dramatic improvements anytime soon. Black unemployment, as high as 41% in some areas, is unlikely to fall quickly. "The future looks extremely bleak," says John Kane-Berman, head of the Johannesburg-based South African Institute of Race Relations. "There is every possibility that the average person will be materially worse off than he is now."

Such a future would be a profound shock to the lost generation. The comrades seem to take it for granted that they have earned the right to the easy life-style enjoyed by whites. They assume that once the A.N.C. controls the government, the benefits will start flowing to blacks.

But blacks lack the education and skills needed to expand the economy significantly in the short term. "There is absolutely no way that those expectations will be met," says Kheila Shubane, 32, a researcher at the University of Winnebago. Under optimal conditions, it could take South Africa between five and 10 years to begin making tangible progress. If adopted, the A.N.C.'s socialist-oriented economic proposals—popular with the lost generation—would only postpone material improvement.

Because the black leadership is afraid to alienate them, the restless youth may exert a baleful influence over the negotiations for South Africa's future political and economic system. "The youth support us because we speak their language—housing, education, jobs," says Jackie Selebi, a member of the A.N.C.'s national executive committee. "As soon as we stop demanding that, we will run into trouble."

This is exactly the kind of talk that makes whites insist on some kind of veto power under a new system. The existence of so many uneducated and unemployed blacks, says government negotiator Stoffel van der Merwe, "makes it more important to have a constitution in which the power of the majority is very definitely subject to checks and balances."

One way or another, the next generation of blacks can expect to win control of their lives. That will be a great day in South Africa. But no new political system—at least in the near future—will be able to fulfill the hopes of the generation that has already been lost. —With reporting by Peter Hopkinson, Cape Town

The morning after a battle with the Zulus: two young survivors huddle outside what remains of their house in Tokoza.
Dear President Roselle:

Writing on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment, I want to thank you once again for agreeing to meet with the Committee on November 16. You may recall agreeing to receive written questions as a follow-up to the November 16 meeting. The following questions emerged from the Committee's review of the November 16 meeting and are intended to help clarify our collective understanding of various dimensions of University of Delaware policy against Apartheid.

1. What is the basis of longstanding University of Delaware opposition to divestment? Is the rationale economic, political, moral or some combination of these factors? In particular, does the University still maintain that divestment will adversely affect the majority population in RSA?

2. What evidence informs University policy?

3. What evidence would be necessary (or compelling) to change University policy on divestment?

4. It appeared to the Committee that the University has not bought stock in firms doing business in RSA. Is our impression valid? Is this deliberate policy? Have stocks of firms doing business in RSA been sold over the past decade as part of a policy decision?

5. It was unclear whether the Board of Trustees' position on divestment was based on a determination consistent with their fiduciary responsibilities or whether their policy was of a political nature distinct from financial considerations. Is the Board of Trustees' stand based uniquely on a determination taken solely within the ambit of their fiduciary responsibilities?

6. Is the Board of Trustees opposed to economic sanctions in principle? Do they not support Congressionally-mandated economic sanctions against RSA? Or, are they selective, supporting U.S. policy but opposing divestment?

7. The Committee was unclear how you termed "programmatic" policy against Apartheid at the University of Delaware was devised. Could the administrative and decision-making structure of programmatic policy be clarified for the Committee?
Answers to these questions, which I hope are not excessive, would greatly aid the Committee. Any further help that you can provide will be greatly appreciated.

For the Committee,

David L. Colton
Chairperson
Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment

DLC/wc
December 6, 1990

David L. Colton
Mathematical Sciences
Campus

Dear David:

Your letter of November 30 is at hand. The nature of several of your questions is that there is quite likely not a single response for all members of the Board of Trustees. Thus, rather than to attempt to set forth all possible responses, I believe it the better course of action to assume that the resolution adopted by the Trustees sets forth well their collective view of the situation.

The question you asked to which I am able to respond is number 7. Specifically, the members of the Board of Trustees have recorded their desire that the University of Delaware conduct educational programs that are helpful to Black South Africans. The exact nature of such programs is for the University faculty and administration to decide. As Provost Murray detailed in the meeting, we have worked with the Episcopal Church, the Institute for International Education and other organizations to increase the number of such interactions. Any further ideas are most welcome and should be forwarded to Provost Murray.

I have referred your item 4 to Bob Harrison for response. I do not have easy access to the exact dates of the purchases of investments.

As we discussed earlier, I am agreeable to carrying forward your request for written commentary related to whatever document you decide represents the views of the Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment. I do not know whether persons will be moved to make comments, but I am convinced that such a process offers a better possibility of gaining a more full understanding than, for example, does your suggestion that I respond to the seven questions in your letter of November 30.

Do let me know if I might be able to be of assistance to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Sincerely,

David P. Roselle
President

DPR/mjm
UD divestment needed for clear signal on racism

The University of Delaware is in a fight for the hearts and minds of its students. The issue is not merely that of freedom of speech for the rotting minds who are trying to spread bigotry on campus, it is also whether the university can enter the fray with credibility.

To that end, university officials and trustees would be wise to jettison the same belief that divesting South African holdings would make things worse for black people in that nation.

A great many institutions bigger than the University of Delaware have divested such holdings and, from the standpoint of changing the policies and law of South Africa, black South Africans are far better off.

Many black South Africans, including Bishop Desmond Tutu, believe that the divestment movement in the United States accelerated the changes now occurring there.

In any case, divestment is a political act. It states the principles of the institution; draws a clear moral line against apartheid.

Continued failure to draw such a line, state such principles, constitutes a fundamental flaw in all of its other arguments in favor of human rights.

No institution in that position, no matter how worthy its intentions and how many scholarships it extends, can credibly combat racism on its own turf without appearing to be hypocritical.

Bishop Tutu would say to the trustees, as he has to many others who espouse the same position, "We don't want you to polish our chains; we want you to help us break them."

The University of Delaware is still among the chain polishers and the bigots know it.
Time to divest

Last week, the need for the university to divest from South Africa became more urgent than ever before.

F.W. de Klerk, president of South Africa, has proposed reforms that would further break down the walls of apartheid.

The European Community has decided to lift economic sanctions against South Africa in light of de Klerk’s announcements.

But this will only allow South Africa’s apartheid to fester under the guise of surface changes.

De Klerk has not enacted the reforms, economic pressure has.

Blacks still cannot vote. Apartheid oppresses non-whites, and until every vestige of the system is destroyed, sanctions cannot be lifted. New ones must be imposed.

And that means the university must divest.

The decision is moral. Investing money in an oppressive system is wrong.

The decision is political. Publicly endorsing the system encourages it to grow.

Last year, reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe changed the face of international politics. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for heading reforms that allowed unprecedented freedoms.

Today, that same man praised for perestroika and his commitment to human rights faces charges that he ordered an army crackdown on Lithuania.

At least 15 defenseless people died

The lesson is simple.

Reform is a slow and arduous process that in the hands of any leader faces challenges from societies that reject change.

The Faculty Senate Ad Hoc Committee on Divestment must confront the evils of apartheid and do something to combat them rather than sticking its head in the sand.

Divestment is the only answer.
GUIDELINES FOR REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF PROGRAMS

The Faculty Senate Coordinating Committee on Education, through its "Procedures for Faculty Reduction Because of University-Wide Financial Considerations," mandated a Reduction in Force Committee to develop criteria by which academic programs could be reduced or eliminated. The committee's criteria are predicated upon the:

A. Maintenance of academic freedom and tenure, which are important to creative and free inquiry;

B. University commitment to the principles of affirmative action; and

C. Balanced mission to promote excellent instruction, research, and service. The University has made this balance explicit through a planning process of the last four years, beginning with Project Vision. Recently the Focused Vision Implementation Committee outlined five strategic goals for the University in keeping with its Land Grant and Sea Grant mission:

1. Provide high-quality, affordable undergraduate education that gains greater recognition in the state, region and nation.

2. Strengthen research and increase the national and international distinction of selected graduate programs.

3. Better integrate public service values into University life and provide greater assistance to our state, nation and global community.

4. Nurture a campus environment characterized by respect for people of different genders, nations, sexual orientations and backgrounds.

5. Provide the human intellectual, cultural, financial, and physical resources required to meet the University's goals.

The Reduction in Force Committee affirms that reductions of faculty, if necessary, should occur in specific programs rather than across the board. In this way, we can strengthen those programs most likely to attain the University's long-term goal of excellence, rather than weakening all programs equally without relation to their current or proposed status within the institution. The Guidelines for Reduction and Elimination of Programs follows.
1. Centrality to the Mission of the University
   a. Is this activity essential to the mission, current needs and future plans of the University?
   b. Does this program contribute to students in other programs to a significant extent?
   c. Does this program meet the standards of a leading research university?

2. Quality of Instruction
   a. What are the standards for admission?
   b. Is there excellence in the quality of instruction?
   c. Are a high number of students retained in the program?
   d. Are most students placed in careers appropriate to their education?

3. Quality of Research and/or Graduate Education
   a. What evidence is there of excellent scholarship?
   b. How does the program compare with similar programs at other universities?
   c. What external funds have been obtained?
   d. How many graduate students and programs are supported by external grants?

4. Public Service
   a. Is there a necessity for graduates in this field at the present time and in the projected future?
   b. Is the program unique to the state or region?
   c. Does the program provide such an important service that a profession and the community would be damaged without the program?

5. Cost-Effectiveness
   a. What is the faculty teaching load (including T.A.s) at the undergraduate and graduate levels?
   b. What is the number of majors in the program and projected enrollment trends?
   c. How many degrees have been granted in recent years?
   d. What is the redundancy with other programs on campus?
   e. What are the administrative costs per FTE (with T.A.s)?